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Abstract
Cheap-talk communication between parties with conicting interests is common in many
business and economic settings. Two distinct behavioral economics theories, the trust-embedded
model and the level-k model, have emerged to explain how cheap talk works between human
decision makers. The trust-embedded model considers that decision makers are motivated by
non-pecuniary motives to be trusting and trustworthy. In contrast, the level-k model considers
that decision makers are purely self-interested, but limited in their ability to think strategically.
While both theories have been successful in explaining cheap-talk behaviors in separate contexts,
they point to contrasting drivers for human behaviors. In this paper, we provide the rst direct
comparison of both theories within the same context. We show that, in a cheap-talk setting that
well represents many practical situations, the two models make characteristically distinct and
empirically distinguishable predictions. We leverage past experiment data from this setting to
determine what aspects of cheap-talk behavior each model captures well, and which model (or
combination of models) has better explanatory power and predictive performance. We nd that
the trust-embedded model emerges as the dominant explanation. Our results thus highlight the
importance of investing in systems and processes to foster trusting and trustworthy relationships
in order to facilitate more eective cheap-talk interactions.
Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Bounded Rationality, Cheap Talk, Level-k Thinking,
Trust, Trustworthiness.∗
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1 Introduction
In many business and economic settings, communication that is essentially cheap talk in nature
may be used by a party with superior or proprietary information to inuence decisions made by
a less-informed party. For example, consumers receive product information from advertisers and
* The authors thank Ernan Haruvy, Tanjim Hossain, Sanjay Jain, Karen Zheng and participants in their presen-
tation at the 2018 Behavioral Operations Management Conference, 2019 Behavioral IO and Marketing Symposium,
2019 Marketing Science Conference, 3rd Invitational Pricing Symposium, 2020 UTD BASS FORMS Conference and
Johns Hopkins University for their constructive comments. The authors' names are listed in alphabetical order.
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salespeople to make purchase decisions (e.g., Gardete 2013; Chakraborty and Harbaugh 2014),
suppliers receive demand forecasts or soft orders from downstream rms to make capacity and
production decisions (e.g., Terwiesch et al. 2005; Chu et al. 2016), individual investors receive
investment recommendations from nancial managers to make investment decisions (e.g., Michaely
and Womack 1999; Angelova and Regner 2013), and patients receive drug and treatment procedure
information from physicians to decide treatment plans (e.g., Schwartz et al. 2011; Guo et al. 2017).
In these and other practical situations, the information communicated can be easy to distort and
dicult to verify, and the communication does not create binding commitments. Consequently,
talk is cheap and communication need not be truthful.
In fact, the interests of the two parties are never fully aligned and there is often a monetary
incentive for one party to manipulate the other through cheap talk to obtain desired outcomes. For
example, advertisers earn revenues and salespeople earn commissions from convincing consumers
to buy; downstream rms realize higher sales and prot if they can ensure abundant upstream
supply; nancial managers make commissions if investors invest; and physicians bill for procedures
performed and may receive perks from pharmaceutical companies. Nevertheless, cheap talk is
widely used in such situations. At the same time, ample anecdotal evidence and empirical research
have shown that cheap talk can be eective to coordinate decisions and improve outcomes in some
instances, even as it has led to serious failures in other instances (e.g., Michaely and Womack 1999;
Terwiesch et al. 2005; Özer et al. 2011; Schwartz et al. 2011; Brinkho et al. 2015). Therefore, it is
important to understand how cheap talk works and when it can be eective.
Starting with the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982), standard economic analysis has
studied the eectiveness of cheap talk in dierent settings. Standard theory assumes that the receiver
of the communication strategically anticipates how cheap-talk information may be distorted by the
sender of the communication and responds to the information accordingly; similarly, the sender
(she) strategically anticipates how the receiver (he) will be inuenced by cheap talk and distorts
the information accordingly. In equilibrium, these strategic behaviors interact and reinforce each
other and determine whether and to what extent cheap talk can be eective. In this context, cheap
talk is said to be informative if it (partially) reveals the sender's information, and inuential if it
aects the receiver's actions. Standard economic analysis provides bounds for how informative and
inuential cheap talk can be in a given setting.
However, experimental research has consistently found that there is systematic over-communication:
cheap talk is more informative and inuential than predicted by standard theory (e.g., Cai and Wang
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2006; Mazar et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2010; Schwartz et al. 2011). In particular, informative and
inuential communication occurs even in cases where standard theory predicts that it should not
(e.g., Forsythe et al. 1999; Özer et al. 2011; Spiliotopoulou et al. 2016). Another consistent nding
is that there is substantial heterogeneity in behaviors, with senders diering in the extent to which
they distort messages, and some receivers being more inuenced than others (e.g., Cai and Wang
2006; Mazar et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2010; Özer et al. 2018).1
Motivated by these ndings, two distinct behavioral economics theories have emerged to explain
how cheap talk works between human decision makers. One theory is based on a positive view
that individuals are guided not only by their self-interest, but also by non-pecuniary motives to be
trusting and trustworthy in their interactions with others. Specically, senders face a non-pecuniary
disutility from lying due to factors such as adherence to social norms, guilt, maintaining positive
self-image and other-regarding preferences (e.g., Gneezy 2005; Mazar et al. 2008; Lundquist et al.
2009; Erat and Gneezy 2012; Scheele et al. 2018). Consequently, they distort less than predicted by
standard theory. Further, receivers place a higher belief in others acting in a trustworthy manner
than predicted by standard theory for a calculative decision maker who uses Bayesian inference
(e.g., Forsythe et al. 1999; Cain et al. 2010; Özer et al. 2011; Schwartz et al. 2011). Consequently,
they are inuenced more than predicted by standard theory. Moreover, an individual's disposition
for being trusting or trustworthy is expected to be an intrinsic characteristic of that individual,
gradually formed through life experiences, inuenced by social norms, environment, and personal
values (e.g., Moorman et al. 1993; Doney and Cannon 1997; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Hardin 2002;
Özer et al. 2011; Beer et al. 2018; Özer and Zheng 2019). Consequently, there is heterogeneity in
trusting and trustworthy behaviors (e.g., Ashraf et al. 2006; Gibson et al. 2013; Özer et al. 2018).
Özer et al. (2011) formally propose and test a trust-embedded model of cheap talk that accounts for
these factors. They show that it not only explains the observed eectiveness of cheap talk (while
standard theory only predicts uninformative communication), but also ts and predicts individual
participant-level (out-of-sample) behaviors well, and provides correct comparative statics predictions
for how cheap-talk behavior is aected by changes in the experimental parameters.
The other behavioral theory is based on the somewhat grim view that individuals are primar-
ily self-interested, but limited in their ability to think strategically in pursuit of their self-interest
(e.g., Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Crawford 2003; Wang et al. 2010). Specically, the level-k
model of cheap talk considers that decision makers dier in their ability to think strategically. A
1We remark that these experiments are designed to minimize repeated interaction and reputation eects. Thus,
the higher eectiveness of cheap talk cannot be explained by these mechanisms.
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boundedly-strategic receiver does not fully anticipate the extent to which the sender, especially one
who is more strategic than the receiver, may have distorted the message. Hence, such a receiver
is more inuenced than the fully-strategic receiver under standard theory. Similarly, a boundedly-
strategic sender does not fully anticipate the extent to which the receiver may discount the message,
and hence may distort less than the fully-strategic sender under standard theory. Consequently,
boundedly-strategic thinking can lead to over-communication. Furthermore, heterogeneity in sender
and receiver behaviors arises due to the dierences in strategic ability. Cai and Wang (2006) nd
that the over-communication (relative to standard theory prediction) in their cheap-talk experiments
could be explained by the level-k model. They nd that the agent quantal response equilibrium
(AQRE) model proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1998), in which players have correct beliefs
about their opponents but deviate from their payo maximizing decision due to bounded rationality,
can also explain over-communication in their setting. Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009), however, nd
that only the level-k model can consistently explain over-communication in their cheap-talk exper-
iments, whereas the AQRE model predicts only uninformative communication. Wang et al. (2010)
use eye-tracking to capture how sender participants viewed payo information in their cheap-talk
experiment. Based on the level-k model, the authors structurally estimate each sender participant's
level of thinking, and show that the payos that a participant pays most attention to is consistent
with her estimated level of thinking.
Thus, both behavioral theories have been shown to explain cheap-talk behaviors better than
standard theory, albeit in separate contexts. Both behavioral theories are also reasonable in many
practical situations. For example, consumers might be inuenced by salespeople because of their
tendency to place trust based on their personal rapport with the salesperson (e.g., Doney and
Cannon 1997; Schwartz et al. 2011); or, because their limited strategic thinking leads them to
underestimate the salesperson's strategic intent in providing product information (e.g., Campbell
and Kirmani 2000; Cain et al. 2010). Similarly, the salesperson may be relatively truthful either
because of non-pecuniary cost of lying, or because of underestimating the consumer's ability to
anticipate the strategic intent of the salesperson.
However, the two theories point to contrasting underlying drivers for behaviors and, therefore,
lead to dierent implications for improving cheap-talk communication. For example, if behaviors
are primarily driven by trust and trustworthiness, then measures to build trust such as reducing
perceived vulnerabilities a receiver faces, or social uncertainties surrounding a sender can be eective
in improving cheap-talk interactions (Özer and Zheng 2019). In contrast, if behaviors are primarily
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driven by boundedly-strategic thinking, then what can be done to improve cheap-talk interactions
can be quite limited. Instead, rms must reduce their reliance on cheap talk and / or make com-
munication non-cheap-talk (through costly monitoring, verication, contracting or punishments).
Consequently, comparing the two theories within the same context is of theoretical and practical
interest. Indeed, Joel Sobel, a pioneer of cheap-talk research, identied such a comparison between
boundedly-strategic thinking and non-pecuniary motives as an important gap in the current under-
standing of cheap talk (Sobel 2013, page 409). Developing a more rened understanding of these
behavioral drivers can help scholars and practitioners develop processes and establish more eective
cheap-talk interactions that lead to protable outcomes.
In this paper, we conduct the rst direct comparison of both behavioral theories within the
same unied context. Our objective is three-fold. First, to determine which behavioral model on its
own has better explanatory power for observed behaviors in the same cheap-talk context. Second,
to understand what aspects of behaviors each model capture well, and where each fares poorly.
Third, to explore whether the performance of the individual models can be improved, including, by
integrating them into a combined hybrid model. Overal our goal is to shed light on what aspects
of behaviors each model captures well in the same context, and which model explains majority of
the observed behaviors.
We leverage existing cheap-talk experiment data from Özer et al. (2018) to conduct the compar-
ison; as we elaborate in 2, their context and experiments are particularly well-suited for comparing
the two behavioral models and further well represent many practical situations, and the authors
share this data with scholars (hence it is readily available). We show that while both models can
potentially explain the over-communication phenomenon and heterogeneity in behaviors in this
cheap-talk context, they lead to dierent implications for how people arrive at their decisions and,
hence, predict distinct patterns of individual-level behaviors (i.e., even though, at rst look, indi-
viduals' resulting decisions may look similar under both models, a careful analysis reveal how they
are dierent). As a result, we are able to empirically distinguish between the model predictions
based on how well they account for observed behaviors.
We structurally estimate both models, and compare their performance with respect to in-sample
t, out-of-sample predictions, and ability to recover the eect of an experimental manipulation.2 We
further examine several extensions to the models, including hybrid models. Overall, we nd support
2Prior work that compare the explanatory powers of alternative behavioral theories in the same experiments using
structural models of individual-level behaviors include Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) for guessing games (beauty
contests), Crawford and Iriberri (2007) for auctions, Bostian et al. (2008) and Ho et al. (2010) for newsvendor models,
and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2012) and Ho and Su (2013) for extensive-form games.
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for the more positive view of human behavior as the dominant explanation; namely, that individuals
are not only guided by their pecuniary self-interest, but also by their non-pecuniary motives of trust
and trustworthiness. Thus, our results highlight the importance of designing processes to foster
trusting and trustworthy relationships for cheap-talk interactions.
Our work adds to the growing behavioral literature in operations and marketing examining
strategic interactions between parties in various business and economic environments. One litera-
ture stream has examined the role of boundedly-strategic thinking in settings dierent than ours.
Researchers have used the cognitive hierarchy model to analyze competitive interactions between
rms in the context of market entry (Goldfarb and Yang 2009; Goldfarb and Xiao 2011), pric-
ing (Zhou et al. 2015) and inventory decisions (Chen et al. 2012; Feng and Zhang 2017; Cui and
Zhang 2018), and also to study strategic interactions in presence of externalities in the context of
reference-group eects amongst consumers of luxury goods (Amaldoss and Jain 2005, 2010) and
participation in two-sided markets (Hossain and Morgan 2013). This literature stream has not ex-
amined cheap-talk communication between parties with conicting interests.3 Another literature
stream has examined the role of trust and trustworthiness due to non-pecuniary motives in facili-
tating cheap-talk forecast sharing in a supply chain, between a single supplier and a retailer (Özer
et al. 2011), between a single supplier and multiple retailers (Spiliotopoulou et al. 2016), and in
a supply chain bridging cultures (Özer et al. 2014). Researchers have also examined the design
of pecuniary contracts to incentivize truthful forecast sharing in a supply chain in the presence of
non-pecuniary motives (Inderfurth et al. 2013; Spiliotopoulou et al. 2016). This literature stream on
forecast sharing, however, has not examined the role of boundedly-strategic thinking. In contrast,
the present paper examines whether non-pecuniary motives, more specically trust and trustworthi-
ness, or boundedly-strategic thinking, more specically the level-k model, better explains cheap-talk
behavior. Lastly, researchers have also examined how strategic interactions between collaborating
parties with conicting interests in other settings (without private information or cheap talk) is
inuenced by various non-pecuniary motives, such as fairness and reciprocity (Loch and Wu 2008;
Katok and Pavlov 2013; Lim and Ham 2014; Cui and Mallucci 2016), reference dependence and loss
aversion (Lim and Ho 2007; Ho and Zhang 2008; Katok and Wu 2009; Davis et al. 2014), and other
types of social preferences (Kessler and Leider 2012; Lim and Chen 2014; Beer et al. 2018).
3We remark that Chen et al. (2012) and Cui and Zhang (2018) use the quantal-response equilibrium and cognitive
hierarchy models, respectively, to explain the ordering decisions of multiple retailers served by a single supplier in a
capacity allocation game. In this game, the retailers' ordering decisions constitute cheap talk. However, the focus of
these studies is on the competitive interactions between retailers; the supplier's capacity is allocated (in proportion
to their orders) according to a xed allocation rule, and the strategic response of the supplier is not examined.
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In what follows, in 2, we describe the cheap-talk game in Özer et al. (2018). In 3, we derive the
behavioral predictions of the two behavioral economics models for this cheap-talk game and show
that they lead to empirically distinguishable predictions. In 4, we discuss the experiment data and
preliminary evidence supporting either model, and describe our model estimation and comparison
approach. In 5, we present our results and observations. In 6 and 7, we examine various model
extensions. In 8, we conclude with a discussion on the implications of our ndings.
2 A Context to Compare the Behavioral Models of Cheap Talk
To compare the behavioral models, we require a setting in which they make distinct predictions, i.e.,
each model predicts certain behaviors in that setting that can be uniquely explained only by that
model. As noted in Sobel (2013), distinguishing between non-pecuniary preferences and boundedly-
strategic behavior can be challenging as both can lead to some form of over-communication and
heterogeneity in behaviors. We focus instead on the dierences in the underlying decision processes
and patterns of individual-level behaviors that lead to over-communication and heterogeneity.
Two features of the cheap-talk game in Özer et al. (2018) make it well-suited for our study.
First, the sender's (pecuniary) payo does not constrain the extent to which the sender will distort
her message to mislead the receiver. This feature provides maximum scope to distinguish between
a model that includes non-pecuniary factors that constrain behaviors, namely the trust-embedded
model, and one that does not, namely the level-k model. Specically, the sender's payo is strictly
increasing in the receiver's action. Consequently, the sender always prefers that the receiver takes the
highest action regardless of the sender's private information. We say that the sender is insatiable
since the sender is not satised no matter how high the receiver's action is. Another useful
implication of this payo structure is that the cognitive hierarchy model (an alternative model of
boundedly-strategic thinking) predicts similar patterns of behavior as the level-k model (see 6.1).
Hence, it is not necessary to separately consider such alternative models in this setting. Second,
the sender and receiver strategy spaces are large: the number of possible sender messages is 81
and receiver actions is 181. Intuitively, a small strategy space limits the room for the predictions
of the two models to dier and makes it dicult to reliably distinguish between their predictions,
especially after allowing for random errors in participant decisions.4 In contrast, a large strategy
space provides more scope to observe dierences in predicted behaviors.
Furthermore, the cheap-talk experiments in Özer et al. (2018) include an experimental manip-
4In a similar vein, Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) discuss the usefulness of larger strategy spaces in two-person
guessing games to reliably dierentiate between dierent models of non-equilibrium behavior.
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ulation that provides an additional means to compare the models, namely, how well they predict
and recover the eect of the manipulation. We formally derive the model predictions and elabo-
rate rigorously on the aforementioned issues in 3 and throughout the paper. To our knowledge,
only Özer et al. (2018) use cheap-talk experiments that incorporate an insatiable sender and large
strategy spaces (see Appendix B for a comparison of the experimental setups in prior cheap-talk
experiments). Therefore, their setting and data provides a natural and useful starting point for our
study. We describe their cheap-talk game below.
Cheap-talk game in Özer et al. (2018). A supplier (e.g., P&G) shares information about
its product's market (e.g., sales) potential with a retailer (e.g., Kroger) to inuence how much store
resources (e.g., shelf space) the retailer allocates to the supplier's product. The supplier is better
informed about the market potential than the retailer. However, the information it shares is cheap
talk. Moreover, the supplier prefers that its prodict is allocated the maximum amount of available
store resources, irrespective of the product's actual market potential, because higher store resources
result in higher sales and prots for the supplier. In contrast, the retailer prefers to allocate store
resources depending on the market potential as store resources are costly. Knowing this fact, the
supplier has an incentive to manipulate the market information it communicates to the retailer.
Formally, the market potential for the supplier's product is uncertain, given by q = ξ + ε,




, and ε is an integer that is uniformly
distributed over [−e, e]. The variable ξ is known to the supplier but not to the retailer, and
represents the supplier's private demand information; the other variable ε is not known to either
party, and represents the inherent market uncertainty. The sequence of events is as follows. The





Then, the retailer decides the service level a ∈ [0, ā], which represents the level of store resources
allocated to promote the supplier's product. Then, market uncertainty ε and hence demand is
realized. Demand for the product is given by D (a) = qa; thus, the eectiveness of retail service
a in stimulating demand depends on the product's market potential q. The supplier delivers the
product to the retailer at a prot margin s, and the retailer sells the product to end consumers at
a retail margin r. The retailer's cost of service is C (a) = 12ca
2. The supplier's and retailer's prots
are respectively:5
ΠS = sqa = s (ξ + ε) a, (1)
5We adapt the model notation in Özer et al. (2018) to suit our context. In their notation, the supplier's payo is
wqs and the retailer's payo is (r − w) qs− 1
2
ks2, where s is the retailer's service level, r is the retail price, w is the





ca2 = r (ξ + ε) a− 1
2
ca2, (2)
Note that the retailer can benet from knowing the supplier's private information, since service is
costly and its eectiveness depends on the product's market potential. However, the supplier benets
from inducing as high a service decision as possible regardless of the actual market potential, since
its prot is strictly increasing in the retailer's service level a. Thus, the interests of the two parties
are not aligned. Moreover, communication regarding the product's market potential is essentially
cheap talk (i.e., the supplier's report of ξ is costless, non-binding and not veriable).
Since our interest extends beyond the above distribution channel setting, in the rest of the paper,
we abstract away from this specic setting; specically, we adopt the terminology of a sender-receiver
cheap-talk game, denoting the supplier as the sender, and the retailer as the receiver. We also discuss
below other cheap-talk settings with similar payo structure, i.e., cheap talk by an insatiable sender.
Thus, our ndings can be of interest beyond the above distribution channel setting.
Other settings with cheap talk by an insatiable sender. We remark that cheap talk by
an insatiable sender can represent many other practical situations. For example, online platforms
(e.g., Airbnb, Amazon, eBay) are better informed about market conditions than sellers or service
providers on their platform, and advise them on improving product or service quality to increase
demand. A salesperson is better informed about his or her sales territory than management, and
requests costly marketing support such as advertising or promotions to aid the sales process. Car
mechanics are better informed about the condition of their customers' cars, and inform customers
about how extensive repairs need to be. A physician is better informed about a patient's condition,
and helps the patient decide between dierent treatment plans. In these examples, the sender
(supplier, platform, salesperson, mechanic, physician) always benets from inducing the receiver
(retailer, seller, management, car owner, patient) to make a substantially large decision (in service
level, service quality, marketing support, repair cost, intensity of or degree of medical treatment)
regardless of the true need for the receiver to do so.
3 Predictions from Standard and Behavioral Economic Models
We rst present the predictions of the standard theory model for the (aforementioned) cheap-talk
game in Özer et al. (2018). These predictions serve as the benchmark for determining what consti-
tutes over-communication in this context. We then develop and compare the theoretical predictions
from the two behavioral economic models. We show that both models predict over-communication
relative to standard theory predictions, and heterogeneity in the extent to which senders distort
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their message and receivers are inuenced by sender messages. However, they also predict dierent
patterns of individual-level behaviors leading to over-communication and heterogeneity, due to the
dierences in the underlying decision-making processes.
Before, we proceed, it is useful to dene the receiver's optimal strategies under two extreme





denote the receiver's fully-believing optimal strategy when he believes ξ̂
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3.1 Standard Theory Predictions
We restate the standard theory predictions from Özer et al. (2018). Let ξ̂ (ξ) denote the sender's




denote the receiver's strategy upon receiving the sender's
message ξ̂. Özer et al. (2018) show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of this cheap-talk game are
uninformative and uninuential.
Theorem 1. (Adapted from Özer et al. 2018) In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the sender's




= aNI , independent of ξ̂.
Theorem 1 is a consequence of the sender being insatiable (i.e., sender's payo being strictly
increasing in receiver's action). Intuitively, regardless of her actual information ξ, an insatiable
sender always prefers to send a message that will induce the highest action that the receiver is willing
to take. Consequently, the sender's message is uninformative. In equilibrium, the receiver correctly
anticipates the sender's behavior and always takes the fully-disbelieving action aNI , ignoring the
sender's messages. Thus, standard theory predicts uninformative and uninuential communication.
3.2 The Trust-embedded Model and Predictions
The trust-embedded model, originally introduced by Özer et al. (2011), incorporates individuals'
non-pecuniary preferences to be trusting and trustworthy. In the context of communication games,
trustworthiness is dened as the sender's tendency not to manipulate her message to her own
monetary benet at the expense of the receiver, and trust is dened as the receiver's tendency to rely
on the sender's message to make decisions, even though the message may have been manipulated,
exposing the receiver to signicant monetary loss (see Özer and Zheng 2019 for a comprehensive
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discussion of these denitions). We rst describe the components of this model, and then obtain
the predictions for our specic context.
The trust-embedded model diers from the standard economic model in three respects. First, a
sender incurs a disutility from lying. Researchers have shown that some people are averse to lying
in economic interactions even at the expense of their monetary gain (e.g., Gneezy 2005; Mazar et al.
2008; Lundquist et al. 2009; Erat and Gneezy 2012; Scheele et al. 2018), in eect experiencing an
intrinsic psychological cost from lying. The lying cost can be attributed to factors such as adherence
to social norms, maintaining positive self-image, avoiding hurting others, and other social motives.
Furthermore, the lying cost is increasing in the size of the lie (e.g., Mazar et al. 2008; Gneezy
et al. 2018; Scheele et al. 2018).
Accordingly, the trust-embedded model assumes that a sender incurs a lying cost G
(∣∣∣ξ̂ − ξ∣∣∣ ; γ),
where
∣∣∣ξ̂ − ξ∣∣∣ is the magnitude of the lie and γ ≥ 0 denotes the sender's lying cost type. The lying
cost function G (·) is strictly convex and increasing in the magnitude of the lie. Let g
(∣∣∣ξ̂ − ξ∣∣∣ ; γ) =
∂G(|ξ̂−ξ|;γ)
∂ξ̂
denote the marginal cost of lying. The lying cost type γ indexes the lying cost such
that: (i) a sender incurs no lying cost if γ = 0, i.e., G
(∣∣∣ξ̂ − ξ∣∣∣ ; γ = 0) = 0; and (ii) the sender's
marginal cost of lying g
(∣∣∣ξ̂ − ξ∣∣∣ ; γ) is strictly increasing in γ for all ∣∣∣ξ̂ − ξ∣∣∣ > 0. We impose the
regularity condition that G
(∣∣∣ξ̂ − ξ∣∣∣ ; γ) is twice continuously dierentiable for ξ, ξ̂ ∈ [ξ, ξ̄]; hence, in
particular, g (0; γ) = 0. Let g−1(·; γ) denote the inverse of the marginal lying cost, i.e., if g (x; γ) = y
then g−1 (y; γ) = x, where x, y ≥ 0. In our empirical application (described in the following section),
we use a quadratic lying cost G (x; γ) = 12γx
2; hence g (x; γ) = γx and g−1(y; γ) = yγ .
Second, the trust-embedded model assumes that a receiver follows a relatively simple (non-
Bayesian) belief-updating rule that reects his intrinsic tendency to trust. The standard economic
model requires that a receiver follows Bayes rule to update his belief about ξ given ξ̂, anticipating the
sender's communication strategy for each ξ. However, such a belief-updating rule is complex even in
simple communication games. Instead, human decision makers have been known to adopt simpler
non-Bayesian belief-updating rules (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1982). Moreover, decision makers
have been found to place more trust in others than predicted for a rational calculative decision
maker, a behavior attributed to their inherent tendencies to trust (e.g., Cain et al. 2010; Özer et al.
2011; Schwartz et al. 2011). For example, receivers in communication games have been found to be
overly trusting, assigning higher subjective probabilities of senders' messages being truthful than
should be expected from a rational Bayesian decision maker (e.g., Sheremeta and Shields 2013; Jin
et al. 2018) and being inuenced by messages even in games where standard equilibrium predicts
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that they should disregard all messages (e.g., Forsythe et al. 1999; Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz 2007;
Özer et al. 2011; Spiliotopoulou et al. 2016) including in Özer et al. (2018).
Accordingly, the trust-embedded model assumes that a receiver follows a trust-based belief-
updating rule that can be expressed as follows: given the message ξ̂, a receiver believes that ξ has
the same distribution as αRξ̂ + (1− αR) ξT , where αR ∈ [0, 1] denotes the receiver's trust type and




, namely, a uniform distribution. Essentially, the
receiver believes with probability αR that ξ̂ is truthful, and with probability 1−αR that ξ̂ is inated




with equal probability. Here,
αR is interpreted as the receiver's tendency to trust. If αR =1, then the receiver fully trusts that
the sender is truthful and believes ξ = ξ̂. If αR = 0, then the receiver believes the message is always





Lastly, the trust-embedded model assumes that the sender has a belief about the receiver's trust
type αR, denoted by αS with cdf H (·), that reects the sender's belief about being trusted; for
instance, H (·) may be based on her past experiences of being trusted.












where the receiver follows the trust-based belief-updating rule:
E
[
ξ | ξ̂, αR
]
= αRξ̂ + (1− αR)E
[
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. (6)
Note that if αR = 1, then E
[
ξ | ξ̂, αR
]
= ξ̂ since the receiver believes ξ = ξ̂. If αR = 0, then
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(∣∣∣ξ̂ − ξ∣∣∣ ; γ) , (7)
Let ξ̂∗ (ξ; γ,H (αS)) denote the sender's optimal strategy.
We derive the optimal sender and receiver strategies from Equations (5) and (7). From Equation
(6), we observe that the receiver's belief is increasing in the sender's message. Thus, in general,
the sender's message inuences the receiver, and the receiver's action is increasing in the sender's
message. Accordingly, the sender can have an incentive to inate the message depending on her
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lying cost. The following theorem describes the sender's and receiver's optimal strategies. All proofs
are deferred to Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Under the trust-embedded model, the sender's optimal strategy is
ξ̂∗ (ξ; γ,H (αS)) = min
{






























Theorem 2 nds that the sender inates the message by a factor A (γ, ᾱS) or up to ξ̄, whichever
is lower; where ᾱS denotes the sender's average belief about the receiver's trust. We refer to
A (γ, ᾱS) as the sender's trustworthiness factor ; noting that lower the trustworthiness factor, lower
the extent to which the sender inates the messages, and hence more trustworthy the sender. The
trustworthiness factor, and therefore the extent to which a sender distorts the message, can vary
across individuals. We observe that A (γ, ᾱS) is decreasing in the sender's lying cost type γ since
the marginal cost of lying g (x; γ) is increasing in γ and in x; A (γ, ᾱS) is also increasing in her
average belief ᾱS about the receiver's trust. For receivers, the extent to which a receiver's action is
inuenced by the sender's message is increasing in his trust type αR. If αR = 1, then the receiver














receiver is still inuenced by the sender's message because he believes that the true information is
less than the received message. For αR ∈ (0, 1), the extent to which the receiver is inuenced is
between these two extremes.
Thus, the trust-embedded model predicts distorted, yet informative and inuential communi-
cation. Hence, there is over-communication relative to standard theory predictions. Moreover, the
trust-embedded model predicts heterogeneity in the extent to which senders distort messages and
receivers are inuenced by messages depending on their intrinsic trustworthiness and trust.
3.3 Level-k Model and Predictions
The level-k model of boundedly-strategic behavior has been used to explain deviations from standard
theory in a wide variety of games (see Crawford et al. 2013 and Georganas et al. 2015 for recent
surveys). It was originally proposed for normal-form complete information games by Nagel (1995)
and Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), and subsequently adapted to a cheap-talk setting (a dynamic
game of incomplete information) by Crawford (2003) and Cai and Wang (2006). The level-k model
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departs from the standard economic model by assuming that players are limited in their ability
to anticipate the strategic behaviors of others. Specically, players are distinguished by their level
of thinking : a type Lk player exhibits a level of thinking k ≥ 0. The L0 player is non-strategic,
representing naive or unsophisticated play. Each higher level player is more sophisticated, yet only
boundedly so; anticipating the strategic behaviors of lower levels, but not of levels higher than
oneself.
The level-k model starts with the specication of L0 player behavior. In complete information
games, L0 players are specied as uniformly randomizing across all actions, i.e., the L0 player is
unable to evaluate any consequence of her actions, strategic or otherwise, and chooses an action
arbitrarily. In adapting the level-k model to cheap-talk games, researchers have specied the L0
sender as naively revealing her actual information (Crawford 2003; Cai and Wang 2006; Kawagoe
and Takizawa 2009; Ellingsen and Östling 2010; Wang et al. 2010), i.e., when asked to communicate
her information, the sender fails to consider how the receiver will respond to her message and how
the receiver's action will aect her payo, and simply reports her actual information. Further, an
L0 receiver is specied as credulously believing the sender's message to be true. As Crawford et al.
(2013) (pg. 51) explain: it would be behaviorally odd if a [receiver's] strategically naive assessment
of a message did not initially favor its literal interpretation. In 4.2, we provide preliminary evidence
from the experiment data supporting this assumption. It is important to note that while the L0
behaviors resemble trusting and trustworthy behaviors, the underlying driver for these behaviors
under the level-k model is the inability to think strategically. Further, as explained later in 6.2, in
the context of a cheap-talk game, specifying L0 players as naively randomizing their actions does
not lead to useful predictions. In 6.2, we also examine a level-k model in which a fraction of L0
players may be naively randomizing.
The behavior of higher level players is obtained through iterative thinking about the strategies
of lower level players. Each higher type believes that other players are of the immediately lower
type. Therefore, L1 best responds to L0 behavior, L2 best responds to L1 behavior and so on.
Later, in 6.1, we discuss the cognitive hierarchy model proposed by Camerer et al. (2004), in which
a higher-level type believes that the other player is drawn from a distribution of lower types.
Note that L0 receivers (who are believing) are in eect best responding to L0 senders (who
are truth-revealing). As a result, it is not necessary to separately consider that L1 receivers best
respond to L0 senders as doing so does not give rise to newer predicted behaviors. For example, an
L1 receiver best responding to an L0 sender would behave identical to an L0 receiver; moreover,
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an L1 sender and an L2 sender (best responding to L0 and L1 receivers, respectively) would have
identical behaviors, and so on. To avoid this duplication of behaviors, we follow Cai and Wang
(2006) and Wang et al. (2010) in reorganizing the levels of thinking for receivers as follows: an Lk
receiver believes the sender is Lk (not L(k− 1)); an Lk sender still believes the receiver is L(k− 1).




denote the expected payo given the true state ξ and her message
ξ̂; let ξ̂k (ξ) denote her best response message given ξ; and, let Ξk =
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denote his best response to the sender's message ξ̂.
The L0 sender is naively truth-revealing and, hence, ξ̂0 (ξ) = ξ. The L0 receiver naively believes











ca2 = rξ̂a− 1
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ca2. (8)




in response to a message ξ̂. Hence,














The payos for higher levels are dened iteratively in a similar manner. An Lk sender best






















In particular, following a message ξ̂ ∈ Ξk (i.e., ξ̂ is in the Lk sender's feasible set of messages),











If ξ̂ /∈ Ξk, then the message cannot be from an Lk sender. In this case, following Kawagoe and
Takizawa (2009) and Ellingsen and Östling (2010), we assume that an Lk receiver believes that the
message is from the next highest sender type (lower than Lk) that uses this message.6,7 Formally,
6Such a lower sender type always exists because the set of L0 sender's feasible messages is [ξ, ξ].
7Cai and Wang (2006) and Wang et al. (2010) alternatively assume that the receiver treats an o-equilibrium
message as a mistake, and takes an action corresponding to the nearest on-equilibrium message. In our setting with
large range of sender messages, their approach requires that the receiver ignores fairly large o-equilibrium deviations
and further assumptions are required to x the behavior of higher level players. Moreover, their approach is sensitive
to the assumption that an Lk player assigns strictly zero probability to other players being of any type lower than















is the highest sender type less than k for which ξ̂ ∈ Ξk′ . We
remark that this belief updating approach has intuitive appeal because it is equivalent to perturbing
the Lk receiver's belief about the sender's type slightly such that there is a positive, albeit, arbitrarily
small probability that the sender is of a lower type; sequential rationality and Bayesian inference
then implies that the receiver believes that the sender is of the appropriate lower type.8 Later, in
6.1 and 6.3, we consider variations of the level-k model where there are no unexpected messages
and the beliefs following any message are well-dened.
We solve for the behaviors of each player type iteratively, starting with the L0 receiver. The
following theorem summarizes our results.
Theorem 3. Under the level-k model, an Lk sender's strategy for k > 0 is ξ̂k (ξ) = ξ̂k = max
{
ξ̄ − (k − 1), ξ̄+ξ2
}
.

















where ξ̃k = ξ̂k − 1.
Theorem 3 shows that an Lk sender (k > 0) distorts the message to a particular level that
depends on her level of thinking, i.e., ξ̂k (ξ) = ξ̂k (with some abuse of notation) as described in the
theorem. For example, L1 distorts the message to ξ̂1 = ξ (the maximum message level), L2 sender





a higher level receiver is inuenced by messages up to a threshold message level (ξ̃k = ξ̂k − 1) that
depends on his level of thinking, and ignores messages higher than this threshold. For example, an





these messages, and ignores the message ξ̂ = ξ and takes the fully-disbelieving action aNI for this





messages ξ̂ > ξ̃2, taking action aNI , and so on.
Intuitively, a strategic sender (higher than L0), being insatiable, sends the message that she
thinks will induce the highest action from the receiver, namely, the highest message that she thinks
the receiver will believe. Anticipating such sender behavior, a strategic receiver ignores messages
even slightly perturbed to allow for arbitrarily small positive probability of lower type players.
8Formally, the Lk receiver's behavior is consistent with the following prior belief about the sender's type: the
sender is L(k− 1) with probability ε1, is L(k− 2) with probability ε1ε2, is L(k− 3) with probability ε1ε2ε3 and so on,
where ε1,ε2, ε3... are positive and arbitrarily small. Therefore, conditional on receiving an o-equilibrium message,
the receiver must believe (with probability arbitrarily close to 1) that the sender is of the highest type lower than
Lk (and greater than L0) that uses this message; if no type between L1 and L(k − 1) uses this message, then the






above a threshold message level. Boundedly-strategic thinking determines the sender's belief re-
garding which messages will be believed, and the receiver's belief about which messages have been
distorted. For example, the L1 sender distorts the message to ξ̂ = ξ, since she is insatiable and
expects the L0 receiver to credulously believes all messages. An L1 receiver, anticipating the L1
sender's insatiable behavior, ignores the message ξ̂ = ξ, expecting it to be uninformative. Any other
message is taken to be from the next highest sender who could send that message, namely the L0
sender, and hence believed to be truthful. Proceeding iteratively, an Lk sender sends the message
ξ̂k that induces the highest action by an L(k−1) receiver. Correspondingly, an Lk receiver believes
all messages that are lower than the one sent by the Lk sender (i.e., ξ̂ ≤ ξ̃k = ξ̂k − 1) to be truthful
(sent by a truth-revealing L0 sender), and ignores all other messages, believing them to be from




′ ∈ {1,2... k}) and, hence, uninformative.
Thus, the level-k model also predicts distorted, yet informative and inuential communication
as well as heterogeneity in sender and receiver behaviors across the levels of thinking. Specically,
communication is informative because the L0 sender is truth-revealing; higher-level senders distort
the message to a threshold level based on their level of thinking. Further, receivers are inuenced
by cheap-talk communication upto a threshold message level depending on their level of thinking.
3.4 Comparing the Predictions of the Behavioral Models
At this juncture, it is useful to compare the predictions from the trust-embedded model and the
level-k model. Both models predict distorted yet informative and inuential communication, as well
as heterogeneity in sender and receiver behaviors. Yet, the underlying decision-making processes
represented in these models are quite distinct. In particular, the sender being insatiable results in
distinct predictions from the two models that can allow us to empirically distinguish between their
predictions, especially, in games with relatively large strategy spaces such as the one we study. We
now describe in what ways the predictions of the two models are similar and dierent.
For senders, both models allow for truthful behaviors. In the trust-embedded model, the sender
is fully-trustworthy and truthful if her lying cost is suciently high, such that A (γ, ᾱS) = 1. For
example, under the quadratic lying cost function G
(∣∣∣ξ̂ − ξ∣∣∣ ; γ) = γ2 (ξ̂ − ξ)2 that we use in the







. For γ →∞,
A (γ, ᾱS) → 1. In the level-k model, the L0 sender is naively truth-revealing. Both models also
allow for the sender who always distorts the message to the maximum extent possible, i.e., ξ̂ (ξ) =
ξ̄. In the trust-embedded model, if the lying cost is suciently small such that A (γ, ᾱS) ξ ≥ ξ̄,
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then ξ̂ (ξ; γ, αS) = ξ̄. For example, in the experimental context, ξ = 10 and ξ̄ = 80. Therefore,
A (γ, ᾱS) ≥ 8 would result in the sender always distorting the message to ξ̄. In the level-k model,
the type L1 sender always distorts the message to ξ̄.
However, the two models predict dierent behaviors for senders who are neither truth-revealing
nor always distorting to the maximum extent possible. The trust-embedded model predicts senders
who partially inate their message; the extent to which they inate the message being constrained
by the actual information ξ, since their cost of lying is increasing in the size of the lie. In contrast,
the level-k model predicts senders who distort message to a particular message level that only
depends on their level of thinking; being insatiable, the extent to which they distort their message
is constrained only by their belief about the highest message that a lower level receiver will believe.
For receivers, both models allow for receivers who believe the sender is truth-revealing. In the
trust-embedded model, the receiver is fully-trusting if αR = 1 and believes ξ = ξ̂. In the level-k





. The two models, however, dier in their predictions for receivers
who are not fully-believing. In the trust-embedded model, if αR < 1, then the receiver, following
a trust-based inference rule, is partially or moderately inuenced by all messages. In particular,











2 . In the level-k model, an Lk receiver, following Bayesian inference and iterative
thinking, forms a strategic belief that messages above a threshold are highly distorted and, hence,
uninformative; essentially, the receiver anticipates that a sender higher than L0 is insatiable and
always sends the message that the sender expects will induce the highest receiver action. As a
result, the Lk receiver fully believes and is inuenced by all messages up to a threshold level, and
fully disbelieves and is uninuenced by all messages higher than that threshold.
It is worth noting that prior empirical applications of the level-k model to cheap-talk experiments
(Cai and Wang 2006; Wang et al. 2010) are set in a context in which the sender is satiable: the
sender's payo is strictly increasing in the receiver's action up to a point and then strictly decreasing
thereafter. As a result, the sender's payo structure directly limits the sender's incentive to distort
her message. In particular, the extent to which the sender distorts her message also depends on
the actual information. In turn, receivers are partially inuenced by messages that they believe
are distorted. These predictions are qualitatively similar to that of the trust-embedded model.
Thus, one requires a suitable context in which the two models can be reliably distinguished. Our
theoretical analysis in this section shows that a cheap-talk game in which the sender is insatiable
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and the sender and receiver strategy spaces are large provides such a context.
4 Experiment Data and Empirical Methodology
We describe the experiment data from Özer et al. (2018) and discuss preliminary evidence that
supports either behavioral model. To more systematically determine the extent to which either
model is supported by the data, and what aspects of behavior each model captures well, a more
sophisticated approach is necessary. We describe our empirical methodology for model comparison.
4.1 Experiment Data
The cheap-talk experiments in Özer et al. (2018) use the following experimental parameters: ξ ∼
Unif [10, 80], ε ∼ Unif [−10, 10], a ∈ [0, 180], s = 12 , r = 1, c = 1. Therefore, ΠS =
1
2qa,
ΠR = qa− 12a
2 in Equations (1) and (2); and aNI = 45, aI (ξ) = ξ ≤ 80 in Equations (3) and (4).
Data is available for ve experimental sessions - three main sessions and two additional sessions.
Each session consisted of 12 participants and 11 paid decision rounds.9 The value of ξ (and the
unobserved market shock ε) was varied randomly from one decision round to the next. To minimize
repeated interaction eects, participants were paired randomly and anonymously in each decision
round and never rematched. Further, participants were rotated between the sender and the receiver
roles between rounds, ensuring familiarity with both roles. Thus, each participant completed ve
decisions in one role, which could be sender or receiver, and six decisions in the other.
In the two additional experimental sessions, senders were encouraged to engage in more analytical
thinking. Specically, before making their decision, participants in the sender role were required to
calculate their own expected payos if the receiver made a high (a = 70) or low (a = 20) decision,
and participants in the receiver role were informed of this procedure. We expect the manipulation to
aect the underlying drivers of behaviors under each behavioral model as follows. Under the trust-
embedded model, the manipulation is likely to lower trust and trustworthiness, since making the
pecuniary payo salient and encouraging analytical thinking can crowd out non-pecuniary motives
(e.g., Cappelletti et al. 2011; Cornelissen et al. 2011; Rand et al. 2012; Schulz et al. 2014; Zaki and
Mitchell 2013). Under the level-k model, the manipulation is likely to encourage participants to
engage in higher levels of thinking.
4.2 Preliminary Evidence for the Behavioral Models
Preliminary analysis suggests that there is prima facie support for either behavioral model. First, as
shown in Özer et al. (2018), there is over-communication. In the main experiment sessions, sender's
messages are signicantly correlated with their private information (ρ = 0.66, p < 0.01), and the
9Participants played two unpaid practice rounds (one round in each role) prior to the 11 paid decision rounds.
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receiver's actions are signicantly correlated to the sender's message (ρ = 0.36, p < 0.01).10 Second,
there is considerable heterogeneity in behaviors across senders and receivers. Özer et al. (2018) use
a tertile split based on the deviation from truth-revealing and fully-believing behaviors for senders




) to show that there is considerable
dierence between upper- and lower-most tertiles of senders and receivers.
Third, examining individual-level behaviors, there is preliminary evidence to support the L0
specication of the level-k model: 8 of 36 participants in the main session report their actual
(true) information in at least three of their decision rounds in the sender role, and 3 participants
deviate less than 2 units on average from the credulous (fully-believing) action in the receiver role.11
Further, consistent with the predictions for higher level types starting with this L0 specication,
10 participants in the sender role roughly appear to distort the message to a particular level (i.e.,
irrespective of the true information), with 5 participants distorting close to the maximum level
ξ̄ = 80 (median message ≥ 70) and 5 participants distorting to an intermediate level (median
message < 70); 11 participants in the receiver role appear to be highly inuenced by sender messages
up to a threshold message level and then heavily discount the messages.12 There is also preliminary
evidence of behaviors predicted by the trust-embedded model. In the sender role, 10 participants
are either truthful or inate the message by a small amount (median ination < 10%), 8 participants
inate the message substantially (median ination > 40%), and 9 participants inate message by
an intermediate amount. In the receiver role, 7 participants appear to highly trust messages with
relatively high action-level to message-level ratio (median ratio > 0.9), 10 participants appear to
place low trust (median ratio < 0.5) and 8 participants appear to place moderate trust.
Lastly, the shift in behaviors in the additional (experimental manipulation) sessions compared to
the main sessions appears consistent with what would be predicted from either model (as discussed
above in 4.1). Senders distort their messages more in the additional sessions than in the main
sessions: average ξ̂ − ξ is 11.8 in the main session and 16.6 in the additional sessions (p < 0.01
under Kruskal-Wallis test for the dierence). Further, only 1 of 24 participants in the additional
sessions is truth-revealing in 3 or more decision rounds. And, receivers are less inuenced by sender
messages in the additional sessions than in the main sessions: average a− aI (ξ) is 17.8 in the main
session and 19.9 in the additional session (p = 0.08 under Kruskal-Wallis test for the dierence).
10All p-values are two-sided unless mentioned otherwise.
11In the sender role, 2 participants were truth-revealing in all decision rounds, 2 in all but one decision round, 3
in all but two decision rounds, and 1 was truth-revealing in three decision rounds.
12Remaining participants in either role could not be classied unambiguously; hence, the total count does not add
up to 36. The ad-hoc classications for the level-k and trust-embedded models are based on summary statistics of
participants' individual-level behaviors.
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These observations are consistent with less trusting and trustworthy behaviors in the additional
sessions under the trust-embedded model, and with an increase in level of thinking leading to higher
message distortion (e.g., senders switching from L0 to L1 thinking) and lower message inuence
under the level-k model.
4.3 Structural Model Specication
While the preliminary evidence supports either model, a more sophisticated and systematic anal-
ysis is necessary to compare their explanatory powers, including what aspects of behaviors each
model captures well. In particular, a more sophisticated approach is necessary because the pre-
dicted behaviors depend on unobserved latent types of participants and, at the same time, observed
behaviors can be noisy once we allow for reasonable deviations from theoretically predicted
behaviors. Accordingly, we develop a structural model with latent types to address these issues.
We follow the econometric approach used in prior research for structural estimation of level-k
and other non-equilibrium models (e.g., Haruvy et al. 2001; Crawford and Iriberri 2007; Wang et al.
2010). Specically, we use a logit random-utility formulation for a player's decision. A player's
utility from a decision is the sum of the player's predicted payo (under a particular model) and
a logit shock. The player chooses the decision that yields the highest utility.13,14 The logit shock
can cause the player to deviate from his or her theoretically predicted decision. Nevertheless, the
theoretically predicted decision has a higher likelihood of being chosen and, hence, being observed
in the data.15 For both models, we allow for a mixture of player types to capture the heterogeneous
behaviors across participants. All model parameters, including the probabilities for the player type
mixture, are estimated from the data using maximum likelihood.
Model Likelihood. We construct the likelihood functions for each role as follows. Let N
indicate the set of participants. Let P ∈ {S,R} denote the player's role as a sender (S) or as a
receiver (R). Let ΩP denote the set of player types for role P , and πω denote the probability of
player type ω ∈ ΩP such that
∑
ω∈ΩP πω = 1. In the trust-embedded model, player type refers to
13An alternative approach is to estimate the model using a predicted behavior plus noise strategy, which simply
adds errors from a specied distribution (e.g., truncated normal distribution) to the model predicted decisions. In
this case, the deviations are determined only by the noise distribution and are not payo sensitive. In contrast, the
approach we adopt imposes theory-based structure also on the deviations.
14One exception is the L0 player in the level-k model, whose predicted behavior is not payo-based. In this case,
we adopt the predicted behavior plus noise approach as explained in Equation (13).
15Wang et al. (2010) nd that in their experiments (with small strategy spaces), participants often chose a the-
oretically predicted action. Therefore, they adopt a spiked logit formulation in their model estimation: only the
deviation from the predicted behavior follows a logit distribution, and the spike of the probability with which the
predicted behavior is chosen is estimated from the data. As in Crawford and Iriberri (2007), in our context (with
large strategy spaces), participants often do not choose the precise theoretically predicted action and we adopt the
standard logit formulation.
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the trust or trustworthiness types. In the level-k model, a player type refers to the level of thinking.
Let TiP denote the set of rounds in which participant i plays role P . Participant i in the sender's
role in round t ∈ TiS observes state ξt and sends a message ξ̂it. Participant i in the receiver's
role in round t ∈ TiR observes message ξ̂it and takes action ait. Dene Iit, Dit, respectively, as the








for the receiver role. Let ∆P denote the set of feasible




and ∆R is the set of integers in [0, ā].
Except for the L0 sender in the level-k model (whose theoretical behavior is not payo-based),
we can specify a player's payo from choosing various actions including his or her theoretically
predicted behavior. Let ΠP (Dit, Iit; θω) denote participant i's payo in role P in round t ∈ TiP
from decision Dit given information Iit if the participant's type is ω ∈ ΩP , where θω denotes type
specic parameters in the payo function. In the trust-embedded model, ΠP is given by Equations
(5) and (7). In the level-k model, ΠP is given by Equations (10) and (11). Then, under the logit
random-utility formulation, the probability that participant i in role P , conditional on being type
ω ∈ ΩP , makes decision Dit ∈ ∆P given information Iit in round t ∈ TiP is
PrP (Dit | Iit, θω, λω) =
exp{λω ·ΠP (Dit, Iit; θP (ω))}∑
D∈∆P exp{λω ·ΠP (D, Iit; θP (ω))}
, (12)
where λω represents the precision of the logit errors; we allow for precision to be type-specic. Note
that if λω → ∞, then the player strictly maximizes his or her payo to choose the theoretically
predicted action. Whereas if λω → 0, then the player uniformly randomizes across all actions.
In the case of the level-k L0 sender, following Wang et al. (2010), we consider that the sender
deviates from her truth-revealing behavior ξ̂ = ξ as per a truncated normal shock e with zero mean
and variance σ2L0, such that the observed report ξ̂ = ξ+e ∈
[
ξ − 0.5, ξ̄ + 0.5
]
. Specically, given true
information ξ, the report ξ̂ is the closest integer to ξ+ e . Therefore, the likelihood that participant
i in the sender role conditional on being type L0 chooses a report ξ̂it given true information ξt in
round t ∈ TiS is





















where Φ (·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution.
The likelihood of observing decisions DiP = {Dit : t ∈ TiP } by participant i in role P given
information IiP = {Iit : t ∈ TiP } unconditional on type is










πω : ω ∈ ΩP
}
is the distribution of types, λP =
{




θω : ω ∈ ΩP
}
,
respectively, are type-specic precision and payo parameters. Hence, the model log-likelihood func-
tion for role P given observations DP = {DiP : i ∈ N} and IP = {IiP : i ∈ N} is
LLP (π










πP , λP , θP
}
that maximize the above log-likelihood for each role for each model.
Trust-Embedded Model Player Types. We allow for three trustworthiness types for senders
and three trust types for receivers; the three types being designated as high (H), medium (M) and
low (L) such that ω ∈ {H,M,L} for either role. Allowing for additional types does not improve
model performance (per the log-likelihood ratio test). As discussed in Appendix C, for senders,
the logit choice probabilities in the likelihood function (in Equation 12) are aected only by their
trustworthiness factor A (γω, ᾱSω) and the scaled lying cost λωγω. As a result, only these type-
specic parameters are estimable. For receivers, the trust type αω and the logit error precision λω
are estimable.
Level-k Model Player Types. We allow for player types up to L3 and also include an LH
type whose level of thinking H > 3 is estimated from the data. Prior empirical applications of the
level-k model across a wide variety of games have found that player types higher than L3 are rare,
with most players being of type L1 or L2 (e.g., see surveys by Crawford et al. 2013; Georganas et al.
2015). We include an LH type since in our application context, the iterative logic needed to go
from one level of thinking to the immediately higher level is relatively straightforward compared to
many other games. For example, an L1 sender expects the receiver to believe messages ξ ≤ 80, an
L2 sender expects the receiver to believe messages ξ̂ ≤ 79 and so on. So a player who anticipates
L1 thinking could relatively easily anticipate L2 thinking, in eect thinking in larger steps than
implied by the literal application of the level-k model. The LH type accounts for this possibility.
Thus, we provide more exibility to the level-k model than implied by its literal application.
Furthermore, we nd that combining the lower level types in the level-k model into fewer types
does not aect the model likelihood by much, and hence yields a more parsimonious model that
has substantially better AIC and BIC statistics. Essentially, an Lk player's payo function changes
gradually with the level of thinking. For example, the payo functions for L1 and L2 senders dier
only for ξ̂ = 80, since the L2 sender believes that this message will be ignored (by an L1 receiver)
whereas the L1 sender believes that this message will be fully believed (by an L0 receiver). Similarly,
the payo functions for L2 and L3 dier only for ξ̂ = 79 and so on. In the case of receivers, the
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payo functions for L0 and L1 receivers dier only for ξ̂ = 80, the payo functions for L1 and
L2 dier only for ξ̂ = 79 and so on. Therefore, to avoid unduly penalizing the level-k model for
additional parameters when comparing with the trust-embedded model (using the AIC and BIC
statistics), we combine the lower level player types. For senders, we combine L1 to L3 types into
an L1 ∼ 3 type that has the same payo function as an L1 sender (which yields the best t). For
receivers, we combine L0 to L3 types into an L0 ∼ 3 type with the same payo function as an L0
receiver (which yields the best t). We thus estimate three sender types (ω ∈ {L0, L1 ∼ 3, LH}),
and two receiver types (ω ∈ {L0 ∼ 3, LH}).
4.4 Model Comparison Measures
We compare the models with respect to their in-sample t and out-of-sample forecasting performance
using the data from the main experimental sessions. We also compare their ability to recover the
eect of the experimental manipulation in the additional sessions. For in-sample t, we use the
AIC and BIC of the estimated models; a lower AIC and BIC indicates a better model. For out-
of-sample forecasting performance, we use the following measures: (i) Mean Squared Error (MSE)
between the observed and predicted behaviors; a lower mean square error indicates better forecasting
performance, (ii) Goodness of t of predictions, where we regress predicted behavior with observed
behavior and compare regression slope β̂ and regression R2; a higher β̂ and a higher R2 indicate
better goodness of t. To compare the ability to recover the eect of the experimental manipulation,
we evaluate whether the change in estimated model parameters between the main and additional
sessions is consistent with what each behavioral theory would predict (as explained in 4.1).
To reliably determine out-of-sample forecasting performance with limited data, we use Monte
Carlo Cross-Sample Validation (MCCV) (Hastie et al. 2011). Under MCCV, the data is randomly
partitioned into a training sub-sample, and a validation sub-sample. Each model is estimated
on the training sub-sample. Next, each participant's sender and receiver types are determined
based on their estimated posterior probability of being a particular type. Then, their behavior in
the validation sub-sample is predicted and compared with their observed behaviors. Importantly,
to minimize the risk of over-tting or bias in the selection of the sub-samples that is possible
with limited data, we repeat the above process 1000 times and calculate the average forecasting
performance across these iterations. To partition the data in each iteration, we randomly choose
4 decisions of each player in each role in the training sub-sample, leaving out the participant's
remaining (1 or 2) decisions in that role to be in the validation sub-sample.
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5 Which Model Explains Behaviors Better?
5.1 Model Comparison for Senders
Table 1 summarizes the estimation results for senders.16 For either model, the λ ·γ and λ estimates
being signicantly dierent than zero indicate that the tted behaviors are driven by the underlying
theoretical model predictions (and not just the logit error).17 For the trust-embedded model, we
observe that the high- and medium-trustworthy types are relatively truthful, with trustworthiness
factors AH = 1.02 and AM = 1.07, respectively; the low-trustworthy type inates messages consid-
erably, with a trustworthiness factor AL = 2.5, though not to the maximum extent (which would
require AL = 8, such that ALξ = ξ̄ for ξ = 10 and ξ̄ = 80). A substantial number of participants are
classied as medium- and low- trustworthy types, and a smaller fraction as being of high-trustworthy
type.18 For the level-k model, we observe that participants are mainly classied as type L0, being
truth-revealing, or of type L1 ∼ 3, always distorting the messages to the maximum extent possible
(to ξ̄ = 80). For L0 participants, σL0 = 6.2 indicates some participants classied as L0 may be
nevertheless distorting messages by a non-neglibible extent. Only one participant is classied as
type LH, distorting to a message level ξ̂LH = 48.
Comparing the in-sample model ts of both models, the trust-embedded model performs bet-
ter, with lower AIC and BIC. The out-of-sample forecasting accuracy is also better for the trust-
embedded model, with considerably lower prediction errors, and higher β̂ and R2. Finally, both
models appear to directionally recover the eect of the experimental manipulation as the change in
the estimated model parameters is consistent with the respective behavioral theory prediction (dis-
cussed in 4.2). Specically, the trust-embedded model shows a higher proportion of low-trustworthy
type in the additional sessions than in the main sessions (70.83% vs. 55.56%, p = 0.12), with the
trustworthiness of the low-trustworthy type being lower than before (higher AL than in the main
sessions), both of which translate to higher ination in sender messages. Similarly, there are fewer
high-trustworthy types in the additional sessions and the trustworthiness of the medium-trustworthy
type is lower (higher AM than in the main sessions). Under the level-k model, there is an increase
in the proportion of L1 ∼ 3 and in the proportion of LH types at the expense of the L0 type
16In all model estimate tables, * indicates parameter is signicantly dierent than zero at 2.5% condence level.
We use bootstrapping to determine signicance level (since the models have latent classes).
17The low λL · γL and high λH · γH estimates simply indicate low γL and high γH , consistent with the AL and AH
estimates.
18Participants are classied to be of the type for which their estimated posterior probability of being a particular
type is highest. The model-based classications, in general, need not match the ad-hoc model-free classications (in
4.2) because the model-based classications account for reasonable deviations from theoretically predicted behaviors
and classies participants into limited number of player types (based on the likelihood criterion) to avoid over-tting.
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(47.22% vs. 29.17%, p = 0.08) in the additional sessions, which is consistent with sender partici-
pants engaging in higher level of thinking as predicted by the level-k theory. This shift in the level of
thinking should cause sender messages to be more inated in the additional sessions. Nevertheless,
the trust-embedded model performs better in explaining the observed behaviors in the additional
sessions, with lower AIC and BIC.
Table 1: Level-k and Trust-Embedded Model Estimation Results for Senders
Trust-embedded Model Level-K Model
Model Classication High 4 (11.11%) L0 17 (47.22%)
Estimates Medium 12 (33.33%) L1 ∼ 3 18 (50.00%)
Low 20 (55.56%) LH 1 (2.78%)
Model AH 1.02* ξ̂LH 48*
Parameters AM 1.07* σL0 6.20*
AL 2.50* λL1∼3 1.34*
λH · γH 809.49* λH 16.67*
λM · γM 24.74*
λL · γL 0.84*
In-Sample LL -693.03 -711.58
Model Fit AIC 1402.07 1435.15
BIC 1428.37 1454.88
Out-of-Sample MSE 305.82 355.06
Performance β̂ 0.79 0.69
R2 0.49 0.39
Experimental Classication High 1 (4.17%) L0 7 (29.17%)
Manipulation Medium 6 (25.00%) L1 ∼ 3 12 (50.00%)
Low 17 (70.83%) LH 5 (20.83%)
Model AH 1.03* ξ̂LH 47*
Parameters AM 1.21* σL0 9.09*
AL 2.99* λL1∼3 2.38*
λH · γH 612.74* λH 2.34*
λM · γM 25.60*




5.2 Model Comparison for Receivers
Table 2 summarizes the estimation results for receivers. For the trust-embedded model, we observe
that the high-trust type is highly inuenced by sender messages (αRH = 0.72, not signicantly
dierent than 1), while the medium- and low-trust types are inuenced much less and substantially
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discount sender messages (αRM = 0.13 and αRL = 0).19 A majority of participants are classied
as low-trust type, and a substantial proportion are classied to be of high-trust type. Under the
level-k model, most participants are classied to be of LH type, believing messages only up to a
message level ξ̃LH = 46 and disbelieving all higher messages. A small fraction are classied as
L0 ∼ 3 that are highly inuenced by sender messages; however, λL0∼3 is not signicantly non-zero,
which suggests that the behaviors of these participants is not captured well by the level-k model.
Table 2: Level-k and Trust-Embedded Model Estimation Results for Receivers
Trust-embedded Model Level-K Model
Model Classication High 11 (30.56%) L0 ∼ 3 6 (16.67%)
Estimates Medium 3 (8.33%) LH 30 (83.33%)
Low 22 (61.11%)
Model αRH 0.72* ξ̃LH 46*
Parameters αRM 0.13 λL0∼3 23.49




In-Sample LL -749.67 -779.66
Model Fit AIC 1515.33 1567.32
BIC 1541.64 1580.47
Out-of-Sample MSE 174.18 194.45
Performance β̂ 0.56 0.47
R2 0.41 0.38
Experimental Classication High 4 (16.67%) L0 ∼ 3 2 (8.33%)
Manipulation Medium 7 (29.17%) LH 22 (91.67%)
Low 13 (54.17%)
Model αRH 0.62* ξ̃LH 50*
Parameters αRM 0.36* λL0∼3 8.66







Comparing the in-sample model ts of both models, the trust-embedded model performs con-
siderably better; its AIC and BIC are substantially lower. Further, the trust-embedded model also
outperforms the level-k model in out-of-sample forecasting accuracy, with lower prediction error
19Low trust receivers are still inuenced by the sender's message ξ̂ because they believe that the true state is less

















and modestly higher β̂ and R2. Finally, both models appear to directionally recover the eect of
the experimental manipulation. Specically, the trust-embedded model nds a lower proportion of
high-trust type in the additional sessions than in the main sessions (16.67% vs. 30.56%, p = 0.11).
The level-k model nds there are fewer L0 players (8.33% vs. 16.67%, p = 0.18). Nevertheless, the
trust-embedded model has better in-sample t than the level-k model in the additional sessions,
with considerably lower AIC and BIC.
5.3 Why Does the Trust-Embedded Model Perform Better?
To understand what aspects of behaviors the trust-embedded model captures better than the level-k
model, it is useful to decompose the in-sample prediction error (MSE) for each model by participant
types. In the case of senders, note that the low-trustworthy type in the trust-embedded model (20
participants) and the L1 ∼ 3 and LH types (19 participants, 18 are L1 ∼ 3, 1 is LH) in the level-k
model capture senders who signicantly distort their messages. We nd that the trust-embedded
model captures their behaviors better: in-sample MSE for the low-trustworthy type is 460.53 and for
the L1 ∼ 3 and LH types is 647.87 (676.18 for L1 ∼ 3 participants, and 138.33 for LH participant).
The trust-embedded model also performs better for senders who do not distort much, albeit by
a smaller margin: the in-sample MSE for high- and medium-trustworthy types is 26.07 (1.18 for
4 high-trustworthy participants and 34.37 for 12 medium-trustworthy participants), whereas it is
35.49 for the L0 type in the level-k model (17 participants). In this case, the trust-embedded
model better describes behaviors that are highly-trustworthy but not fully truthful through the
medium-trustworthy type. These dierences between the two models in explaining behaviors is also
highlighted by the gures in Appendix D, which depict the predicted vs. observed behaviors for
dierent sender types under either model. Thus, the the trust-embedded model performs better
because the behaviors uniquely predicted by it are relatively more important in explaining observed
sender behaviors; namely, that of senders who are neither truth-revealing nor always distorting to
the maximum extent.
Similarly, the behaviors uniquely predicted by the trust-embedded model for receivers, namely
those who are not fully-believing, are relatively more important in explaining observed receiver
behaviors. The in-sample MSE for medium- and low-trust types in the trust-embedded model is
189.48 (8.23 for 3 medium-trust participants and 214.2 for 22 low-trust type participants), whereas it
is 199.18 for the LH type in the level-k model (30 participants). The in-sample MSE for participants
classied as being highly inuenced is relatively similar for the two models: 40.29 for the high-trust
type in the trust-embedded model, and 38.63 for the L0 ∼ 3 type in the level-k model. However,
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more participants are classied as being highly inuenced under the trust-embedded model than in
the level-k model, which further contributes to the better performance of the trust-embedded model
across participants. The gures in Appendix D highlight these dierences in explanatory powers by
depicting the predicted vs. observed behaviors for dierent receiver types under either model.
6 Level-k Model Variations
Our results above indicate that the trust-embedded model has better explanatory power than the
level-k model. In this section, we investigate whether the explanatory power of the level-k model is
improved by relaxing certain assumptions.
6.1 Player's Belief About Others' Level of Thinking
The cognitive hierarchy (CH) model diers from the level-k model in that a higher-level player
assigns a positive probability to others being of any lower level type up to L0. Consequently, an Lk




, since he assigns positive
probability to the sender being L0. Hence his beliefs following any message is well-dened without
requiring further assumptions. We defer the details of our analysis to Appendix E. We nd that,
in the context of cheap talk by an insatiable sender, the CH model does not predict substantially
new behaviors and, hence, does not help address the gaps in the level-k model's explanatory power.
Specically, the predicted behavior of an Lk player in the CH model is either exactly the same
(for sender) or almost the same (for receiver) as an Lk or a lower level player in the level-k model.
Intuitively, an Lk sender, being insatiable, always distorts the message to a particular level, namely
the level that she believes will induce the highest expected action from the receiver (given the
distribution of lower level receiver types). In turn, an Lk receiver holds the strategic belief that
messages above a threshold are highly distorted; while there is a small probability that the message
could be from a truthful L0 sender, there is a much higher probability that the message is from a
higher sender type that is distorting its message. Hence, messages above a threshold are heavily
discounted. Thus, no substantially new behaviors are predicted by the CH model. In fact, the
CH model predicts a narrower range of behaviors across player types than the level-k model. For
example, higher level senders may not distort messages to a level below ξ̂ = 76 because they assign
low probability to higher level receivers (see Appendix E).
6.2 Mixture of L0 players
In applications of the level-k model to complete information games, naive behavior of L0 players
is typically specied as uniformly randomizing across all actions. A natural question is whether
such a specication can improve the performance of the level-k model in a cheap-talk application
29
(a game of incomplete information). Note that if all L0 players are randomizing, then the level-k
model cannot explain informative communication. Specically, an L1 receiver best-responding to
a randomizing L0 sender will ignore all messages; an L1 sender best-responding to a randomizing
L0 receiver is indierent between all messages and, hence, may simply randomize. Therefore, we
instead allow for a mixture of L0 senders and receivers, where a fraction η ∈ (0, 1) of L0 senders are
truthful and a fraction 1−η are uniformly randomizing (irrespective of ξ); also, a fraction µ ∈ (0, 1)
of L0 receivers are credulous and a fraction 1−µ are uniformly randomizing (irrespective of ξ̂). We
defer the details of our analysis to Appendix F.
We nd that allowing for a mixture of L0 players mainly aects the behavior of higher-level
receivers, but not of higher-level senders. As before, a higher level sender, being insatiable, distorts
to a particular message level depending on her level of thinking. A higher level receiver fully
disbelieves all messages above a threshold. However, below this threshold, the receiver does not
fully believe the message; he believes the message is from a truth-revealing L0 sender with probability
η and from a randomizing L0 sender with probability 1 − η. Hence, the receiver is only partially
inuenced. This behavior is somewhat similar to the receiver in the trust-embedded model though




> ξ̂ for ξ̂ low
enough for an Lk receiver.20
We nd that this level-k model, in general, does not perform better than the original level-k
model; it provides modest improvement over the original level-k model with regards to AIC in the
main experimental sessions, but performs worse on all other measures. Table 5 in Appendix F shows
the estimation results. As such, our results support the simpler L0 assumptions used in previous
work for cheap-talk games.
6.3 Trembling Behavior
We examine the implication if the Lk sender may tremble while sending her message, deviating
to messages other than ξ̂k, such that all messages are expected from an Lk sender by the Lk
receiver. Formally, an Lk player (sender and receiver) makes decisions following a random-utility
choice process with idiosyncratic logit shocks of precision λ to the systematic payos in Equations
(1) and (2), and anticipates that others also behave in this way (i.e., others also experience logit
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model, conditional on the message not being truthful, the message is believed to be inated and the true information







shocks to their systematic payos). This model may also be seen as incorporating elements of the
AQRE model within the level-k model. The model is solved numerically. We nd that the L1 sender
messages can be partially informative, albeit to a limited extent. Essentially, the magnitude of the
sender's systematic payo is higher if ξ is higher. Hence, as shown in Appendix G, the L1 sender
is less likely to tremble from distorting the message to ξ̄ (and send lower messages) if ξ is higher,
i.e., higher messages are more likely if the true information is higher; as a result, ξ̂ is partially
informative. In turn, the L1 receiver is partially inuenced by the L1 sender's messages (instead
of being either fully-believing or fully-disbelieving). Figure 3 in Appendix G shows examples of
predicted behaviors for specic values of λ. We observe that the behavior of each higher level in
this level-k model is quite distinct from the immediately lower level. Moreover, each higher level of
thinking is no longer a trivial extension of the lower level. Thus, we do not expect players to think
in larger steps. Accordingly, in the empirical estimation, we consider three distinct player types,
namely L0, L1 and L2. Table 6 in Appendix G provides the estimation results and Figure 4 in the
same appendix illustrates the estimated behaviors. We nd that the model performance is worse
for senders and about the same for receivers compared to the original level-k model.
7 Hybrid Models
7.1 Including Level-k Behaviors in the Trust-Embedded Model
While the trust-embedded model performs better overall in capturing behaviors across all partici-
pants taken together, it is possible that the behaviors of some participants are better represented by
the level-k model. We now examine whether the trust-embedded model can be improved upon by
including the behaviors uniquely predicted by the level-k model, namely the LH sender type who
distorts to a particular message level but not to the maximum extent, and the LH receiver type
who is fully-believing up to a threshold message level and ignoring messages above this threshold.
We nd that this hybrid model performs consistently better than the trust-embedded model in
the case of receivers; for senders, the hybrid model performs modestly better or worse depending
on the measure. Table 7 in Appendix H provides the estimation results. For senders, 1 participant
in the main experimental sessions and 5 participants in the additional sessions are classied as LH
type; these are mainly participants classied as low trustworthiness senders in the original trust-
embedded model. For receivers, 5 participants in the main experimental sessions and 3 participants
in the additional session are classied as LH type; mainly those classied as being of low- or medium-
trust in the original trust-embedded model (recall that medium-trust receivers had relatively low
levels of trust). In all cases, the estimated behaviors of the LH types diers substantially from
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that of the trust and trustworthy types in the trust-embedded model. For example, in the main
experimental sessions, the LH sender distorts messages to ξ̂LH = 48, and the LH receiver is fully-
believing of messages up to ξ̃LH = 69 and is then fully-disbelieving of higher messages.
Overall, our results indicates the presence of both types of decision processes across individuals.
We further observe that the behaviors uniquely predicted by the trust-embedded model (i.e., senders
that partially inate messages, receivers who are partially inuenced) better explain behaviors of
more participants. In this sense, the trust-embedded model emerges as the dominant explanation.
7.2 Embedding Lying Cost in the Level-k Model
We investigate whether the process by which a given individual arrives at his or her decisions
includes elements of both behavioral theories. Specically, we introduce lying cost for senders from
the trust-embedded model to the level-k model. We defer the analysis details to Appendix I. In the
presence of lying cost, the L1 sender's messages can be partially informative, similar to the trust-
embedded model; consequently, the L1 receiver is inuenced by the L1 sender's messages, albeit
partially since the receiver anticipates the messages are distorted. In turn, the L2 sender's message
will be tailored to inuence the L1 receiver in the presence of lying costs and can be informative, and
so on. Moreover, the behavior of each higher level is quite distinct from the immediately lower level,
and is not a trivial extension of a lower level of thinking. Therefore, in the empirical estimation, we
consider three distinct player types, namely L0, L1 and L2. We allow for L1 and L2 sender types
to dier in their lying cost parameter γ, and L1 and L2 receivers to dier in their beliefs about the
sender's lying cost.
We nd that incorporating lying cost in the level-k model can improve the performance of the
level-k model substantially. However, the trust-embedded model on its own still performs better and
represents a better parsimony-to-explanatory power trade-o. Table 8 in Appendix I provides the
estimation results. The in-sample performance of the hybrid model for senders is very close to that
of the trust-embedded model. In fact, the estimated behaviors are quite close to the behaviors of
the corresponding trustworthy types, with L0, L1 and L2 roughly matching high, low and medium
trustworthy types, respectively. In this sense, the level-k model converges to the trust-embedded
model for senders and does not display characteristics peculiar to the level-k model (which can
occur for other parameter values). The out-of-sample performance is however much worse than
the trust-embedded model (recall that under MCCV, the model is re-estimated in each new sub-
sample). For receivers, we nd that the in-sample performance is better than the original level-k
model. Essentially, the ability of the model to allow for receivers to be partially inuenced by
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sender messages represents an improvement over the original level-k model. Further, the estimated
behaviors do display some characteristics peculiar to the level-k model; for instance, the L2 receiver
discounts messages dierently depending on whether it believes the messages is from the L2, L1 or
L0 receiver. Nevertheless, its performance still falls short of the trust-embedded model. Figure 5 in
Appendix I illustrates the predicted behaviors for the estimated sender and receiver types.
8 Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we provide the rst direct comparison of two leading behavioral economics theories
of cheap talk that are based on fundamentally contrasting perspectives of human behaviors. We
identify a cheap-talk context that well represents many practical business and economic situations,
namely cheap talk by an insatiable sender, and show that the two theories lead to characteristically
distinct and empirically distinguishable predictions in this setting. Leveraging past experiment data
from this setting, we compare the explanatory powers of both theories to shed light on what aspects
of behaviors each theory captures well, which theory on its own describes behavior the best, and
whether a combined model can improve the explanatory power.
Overall, we nd that cheap talk behaviors are better explained by the more positive perspective
of human behavior, namely, that decision makers are guided by non-pecuniary motives to be trusting
and trustworthy. Thus, eective cheap talk is not simply a matter of boundedly-strategic thinking in
the sole pursuit of self-interest. In a cheap-talk experiment with an insatiable sender, the behaviors
uniquely predicted by the trust-embedded model explain sender as well as receiver behaviors of
most participants better than the level-k model. In particular, senders appear to be constrained in
how they distort messages by non-pecuniary lying costs, and not just motivated by their pecuniary
incentive to be insatiable. Also, receivers appear to be inuenced by messages based on their intrinsic
tendency to trust, and not based on Bayesian inference and iterative strategic thinking. While there
is evidence of boundedly-strategic thinking for some individuals, trust and trustworthiness emerges
as the dominant explanation.
Our results lead to implications for managers as well as scholars studying cheap talk. From a
managerial perspective, even in cheap-talk situations with signicant dierence of interests between
parties (as is the case with cheap talk by an insatiable sender), we nd trust and trustworthiness
play a prominent role. Hence, rms should focus on designing processes to reduce barriers for
and to engineer trusting and trustworthy relationships; for example, by appointing a xed contact
person and avoiding management rotations (Özer et al. 2014; Li et al. 2019), making relationship-
specic investments (Beer et al. 2018), or facilitating interactive video communication between
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participants on an online platform (Özer and Zheng 2019), reducing perceived vulnerabilities and
social uncertainties in market environment (Donohue et al. 2020), or through suitable reputation
and feedback systems (Bolton et al. 2013). From a research perspective, our results indicate that
for modeling cheap-talk interactions, the trust-embedded model provides the best parsimony-to-
explanatory power trade-o. For researchers wanting to use the level-k model, we would suggest
that incorporating sender lying cost from the trust-embedded model can signicantly improve the
explanatory power of the level-k model.
Our work also provides insights about developing a common context to compare models of
boundedly-strategic behavior and non-pecuniary motives. As noted by Sobel (2013), distinguishing
between these theories is an an important gap in the current understanding of cheap talk. However,
doing so can be challenging because both theories can lead to qualitatively similar predictions. Our
theoretical analysis in 3 shows that a cheap-talk game in which the sender is insatiable and the
sender and receiver strategy spaces are large is well-suited to compare the two models. In particular,
such a context oers maximum scope for the models to make characteristically distinct predictions,
for these dierences in predictions to be empirically distinguishable, and also obviates the need to
separately consider the predictions of the cognitive hierarchy model. Thus, we suggest this context
is well-suited to conduct further comparisons of the two models.
In closing, this study represents a concrete step towards understanding what behavioral drivers
are important to capture and explain observed behaviors in a practically relevant cheap-talk context.
Our results encourage us to call for further research to compare the level-k and trust-embedded
models in dierent business interactions and contexts. For example, one could examine cheap talk
in other supply-chain settings with dierent payo structures for the sender relative to the receiver
(e.g, Özer et al. 2011, 2014), or study situations where the informed party provides advice rather
than information (e.g., Özer et al. 2018), as well as situations where communication is not cheap
talk (e.g., Inderfurth et al. 2013; Scheele et al. 2018). Comparing the two models in other business
contexts can further shed light on how to design eective processes to facilitate and coordinate
decisions across a value chain.
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Appendix A Proofs for Theorems







































(∣∣∣ξ̂ − ξ∣∣∣ ; γ) , (17)
Note that ΠS
(
ξ̂, ξ; γ,H (αs)
)
is strictly increasing in ξ̂ for ξ̂ ≤ ξ, and strictly concave in ξ̂ for ξ̂ > ξ.
Hence, there is a unique optimal message ξ̂∗ (ξ; γ,H (αs)) ≥ ξ. From Equation (17), for ξ̂ > ξ,
∂ΠS
(












ξ̂ − ξ; γ
)
. (18)
Since g (0; γ) = 0, it follows that ξ̂∗ (ξ; γ,H (αs)) = min
{
ξ̄, A (γ, ᾱS) · ξ
}
where A (γ, ᾱS) is dened
in the statement of the theorem.
Proof for Theorem 3: We prove this result inductively. An L0 receiver is fully-believing and hence








. Suppose an L (k − 1) receiver believes




, and disregards all higher messages ξ̂ > ξ̄ − k + 1
















2 , ξ̂ > ξ̄ − k + 1.
(19)
Consequently, regardless of her true information ξ, the Lk sender sends the highest message that the
L(k− 1) receiver will believe, namely ξ̂k (ξ) = ξ̄− (k − 1), provided doing so would induce a higher
action than aNI ; if all messages that the receiver believes will induce an action less than or equal to
aNI , then the Lk sender sends the lowest message that induces aNI , namely ξ̂k (ξ) =
ξ̄+ξ
2 . Therefore,
ξ̂k (ξ) = ξ̂k = max
{
ξ̄ − (k − 1), ξ̄+ξ2
}
. An Lk receiver will believe all messages ξ ≤ ξ̃k = ξ̂k − 1,
taking them to be from an L0 sender; and will disregard all higher messages ξ > ξ̃k, taking them
to be from the appropriate sender type from L1 to Lk, and hence uninformative. Therefore the Lk














2, ξ̂ > ξ̃k
(20)








, and action aNI otherwise.
Appendix B Experimental Setup in Prior Cheap Talk Experiments
The table below describes whether in previous cheap-talk experiments the sender is insatiable and
the size of the sender and receiver strategy space. We exclude deception games in which receiver does
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not know sender's payo (e.g., Gneezy 2005; Mazar et al. 2008), capacity allocation games in which
there are multiple senders (Spiliotopoulou et al. 2016) or the receiver's strategy is exogeneously
xed (Cui and Zhang 2018), or games in which the receiver chooses the distribution of his posterior








Dickhaut et al. (1995) No 4 4
Forsythe et al. (1999) Yes 3 3
Blume et al. (2001) No 3 5
Cai and Wang (2006) No 3 3
Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007) Yes 2 2
Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009) Yes 2 3
Lundquist et al. (2009) No 100 2
Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2009) Yes 2 2
Wang et al. (2010) No 5 5
Özer et al. (2011) No 301 301
Sheremeta and Shields (2013) Yes 2 2
Özer et al. (2014) No 301 301
Özer et al. (2018) Yes 71 201
We observe that most past experiments use fairly small strategy spaces with a handful of mes-
sages and actions. Thus, they do not provide sucient scope to reliably distinguish between the
predictions of the two models. Essentially, such experiments were designed to distinguish between
the standard theory prediction and a behavioral economics theory, but are not well-suited for com-
paring two behavioral models, in particular, the level-k and trust-embedded models. We remark
that Özer et al. (2011) and Özer et al. (2014) use experiments with relatively large strategy spaces
for senders and receivers. However, the sender's payo in their context is not strictly increasing for
the entire range of receiver's possible actions. As a result, under the level-k model, the sender's
pecuniary payo structure can also constrain the extent to which the sender distorts the message.
We conjecture that distinguishing the two behavioral models in this case would be more dicult
relative to the cheap-talk context in Özer et al. (2018), which the present paper uses. Another
experimental paper that has large strategy spaces is Scheele et al. (2018). The authors mainly focus
on experiments with costly non-cheap-talk communication. Nevertheless, their experiment design
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includes a benchmark treatment in which communication is cheap talk and the sender is insatiable.
However, this single treatment provides a small dataset: 8 rounds of interaction between 16 partici-
pants. In contrast, Özer et al. (2018) provide 11 rounds of interaction between 60 participants, and
also includes an experimental manipulation.
Appendix C Trust-Embedded Model: Estimable Sender Parame-
ters
The sender's expected payo from sending message ξ̂ given actual information ξ is
ΠS
(


































As described in 4, a type ω sender's logit utility from sending message ξ̂ given actual information
ξ is the sum of her theoretical predicted payo and the logit shock ε, given by
ΠS
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= C (ξ) + F
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2 is independent of ξ̂, and F
(
ξ̂, ξ;A (γω, ᾱsω)
)
= A (γω, ᾱsω) ·
ξξ̂ − 12 ξ̂
2. Substituting from Equation (23) in Equation (12), the logit likelihood of message ξ̂it is
PrS(ξ̂it | ξt, γω, ᾱsω, λω) =
exp{λωγωF
(









Hence, only A (γω, ᾱSω) and λωγω aect the logit choice probabilities.
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Appendix D Predicted vs. Observed Behaviors
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Senders: Level K Model
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